Structural Volatility in Argentina: A Policy Report by Ricardo J. Caballero
Inter-American Development Bank




Structural Volatility in Argentina:
A Policy Report
Ricardo J. Caballero*
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
 National Bureau of Economic Research
August 20002




Structural volatility in Argentina : policy report / Ricardo J. Caballero.
p. cm.   (Research Dept. Working paper series ; 422)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Structural adjustment (Economic policy)--Argentina.   2. Argentina--Economic
policy.  3. Argentina--Economic conditions--1983-.  4. Economic stabilization--
Argentina.  I. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  Dept.  II. Title.   III. Series.
338.543   S475--dc21
82000
Inter-American Development Bank
1300 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20577
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its
behalf.
The Research Department (RES) publishes the  Latin American Economic Policies
Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues. To obtain a
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at:
http://www.iadb.org/res/32.htm3
Acknowledgments
This report is one of a series of brief studies aimed at identifying and hinting at possible
solutions to the main sources of volatility in several Latin American economies. This
series is being directed by the author of this report by request from the Office of the Chief
Economist at the IADB. I am particularly grateful to Fernando Broner for his insightful
collaboration and effort, to Ricardo  Hausmann for extensive discussions on both the
methodology and the specifics, to Mark  Aguiar, Victor  Beker, Eduardo  Borensztein,
Vittorio  Corbo,  Gaston  Gelos and Julio  Rotemberg for useful suggestions, and to
Fernando  Broner, Guido  Lorenzoni, Eric  Parrado, and Laura dos  Reis for excellent
research assistance. I am also indebted to AEI, where part of this report was written, for
their hospitality and support. None of them, and in particular the IADB, is responsible for
the opinions expressed in this report.4
Table of Contents
1. Summary and General Recommendations   5
2. The Facts and Mechanisms   9
2.1 Aggregate Volatility   9
2.2 Weak International Financial Links and Other External Shocks 10
2.3 Domestic Amplification Mechanisms 15
2.3.1 The Credit Crunch and Financial Underdevelopment Problem 15
2.3.2 The Crowding-Out problem 21
3.3.3 The Inflexibility Problem (Claustrophobia) 26
3. Taking Stock 31
3.1. Improving the Links with International Financial Markets 32
3.2. Fostering Domestic Financial Markets and Credit Flows 36
3.3. Controlling Fiscal Imbalances 38
3.4. Dealing with Inflexibility 40
Appendix: Chronology 43
References 495
1. Summary and General Recommendations
The Argentine economy has experienced a dramatic transformation during the 1990s.
Inflation is a matter of the past due to a strong convertibility law; the government is no
longer an important player in the production of goods and services; trade and capital
accounts have been largely liberalized; the pension system has been modernized and
partially privatized; the banking sector’s solvency, transparency and liquidity have been
solidly raised; and so on. Signs of success abound.
An important exception to this rosy scenario is the untamed, or even increased,
volatility of output and employment. The goal of this report is to identify, and hint at
potential remedies for, the structural causes of Argentina’s volatility.
The shocks behind this volatility have changed over time. During the 1980s their
source was mostly domestic–e.g., stabilization attempts and their failure–but in the 1990s
volatility has been sparked mostly by external factors. As with many other emerging
economies, (a) weak international financial links have played a central role in the two
crises faced by Argentina during the post-convertibility era. While external factors seem
to have started recent crises, their impact has been magnified and, at times fostered, by
deficiencies on the domestic front.  There are at least three strongly complementary
domestic amplification mechanisms in modern Argentina: (b) A recurrent credit crunch
and financial underdevelopment problem;
1 (c) a fragile fiscal situation and a multiple-
layers crowding-out mechanism that includes the government and large firms; and (d) a
pervasive profit and collateral squeeze mechanism brought about by a rigid labor market
and exchange rate system.
These domestic deficiencies, which are tested and stressed by external shocks, are
at the same time likely factors behind the weak international financial links. This
complementarity creates a harmful process of volatility-feedback, but it also hints at the
potential synergies of a multidimensional policy package aimed at these problems
simultaneously.
                                               
1 See  Caballero and  Krishnamurthy (1998) for a model of some of the interactions between weak
international financial links and underdeveloped domestic financial markets.6
While not the exclusive factor, the convertibility system is a central ingredient in
the three domestic amplification mechanisms highlighted above. Since there are very
good reasons, rooted in the stability of the payments system, not to abandon such a
system in the near future, policy reforms must work within its constraints. Argentina’s
technocratic economic team has recognized this and has set an example of good liquidity
management within a “currency board” system. Argentina has made substantial progress,
especially on item (b) and some aspects of both (c) and (d) over the last five years.
In a nutshell, and in accordance with the deficiencies highlighted above, this
report contains policy recommendations on four general items:
1)  Improve external financial links and the use of these links during crises. With this
goal in mind, there are at least four slightly more specific recommendations and
considerations:
a)  Adopt international standards on contractual enforcement, disclosure, and
corporate governance.
b)  Implement an active policy of export promotion in order to reduce the
international “illiquidity” of Argentina’s productive structure.
c)  The government and large corporations should be given incentive mechanisms so
that they will internalize their “privileged” position with respect to foreign
investors and financiers during crises.
d)  While  dollarization could in principle enhance Argentina’s international
collateral, this measure is unlikely to help much– and may even reduce collateral–
without improvement on fundamentals and the other aspects of vulnerability
discussed in this report (see below).
2)  Continue and accelerate the path of domestic financial deepening. In particular,
consider:
a)  The possibility of channeling the resources of retirement and pension fund
administrators (in Spanish, abbreviated as  AFJPs) to develop some of these
markets, as well as developing regional markets.
b)  More generally, fostering and nurturing the development of well supervised7
institutional investors is an efficient mechanism to delegate the enforcement of
good corporate governance standards to the private sector, as these institutions
often ponder such factors in their investment decisions.
c)  While foreign banks from  OECD nations often come with solid built-in
supervision from their homeland, they may not always facilitate the smoothing of
sharp aggregate contractions as much as equivalent domestic banks do. This poses
a delicate tradeoff. This said, the solution to this potential problem is not to limit
foreign banks’ participation, but to ensure that structurally important financial
lines remain open when needed.
3)  Give very high priority to the reduction of the public debt burden problem. To this
effect, there are two type of measures which, while clearly sub-optimal in the long
run, may prove helpful in the short and medium run:
a)  Fiscal convertibility clause. While the availability of counter-cyclical fiscal
policies is a blessing in normal OECD-like circumstances, it is not of much use
when the nature of the crises is mostly one of loss of confidence by international
financial markets. Thus the cost of losing this policy tool during the typical
Argentine recession may not be large relative to the gains associated with a
healthy fiscal stance during good times.
b)  Limits on the collateralizability of the provinces’ co-participation receipts.
4)  Address the fundamental incompatibility between labor market rigidities and a highly
inflexible exchange rate system, coupled with very low world inflation. Although this
report endorses the idea of dealing with the former, while postponing any potential
flexibilization of the latter, I briefly surmise concerns about dollarization as well.
On the labor market side, several issues should be considered:
a)  The process of labor market reform should be continued, perhaps by reintroducing
some form of “temporary contracts.” While the latter has proven ineffective in
dealing with structural unemployment in Europe, it may provide an important
buffer to economies like Argentina’s which are occasionally subject to very large
shocks. The tension between structural damage and cyclical benefits can be dealt8
with by making temporary contracts contingent on aggregate conditions (i.e., only
acceptable during recessions).
b)  It is not clear whether the dominant cyclical inflexibility in wages at this time is
real or nominal. While both forms of rigidity feed into each other, their solutions
are quite different. Given the current exchange rate system, nominal rigidities will
largely fade away with the passage of time, and with sustained low inflation,
rather than through deregulation.
c)  In the short run, reforms aimed at reducing the non-wage component of labor
costs should be fast-tracked, but they must work in conjunction with offsetting
fiscal adjustments so as not to further expose a fragile fiscal situation. At this
time, supply incentives should have a higher payoff than demand incentives,
justifying the tradeoff.
On dollarization, and at an even more conjectural level than the discussion above,
I surmise that:
a)  While it is wise to discuss the issue in the midst of a crisis, it is probably not a
good idea to actually implement it. Given the near irreversibility of the
dollarization decision, it does not seem sound to adopt it unless long-run
considerations support it, and this is highly unlikely (at least as a unilateral
action).
b)  Moreover, the short and medium run advantages of dollarization may have been
exaggerated.
The rest of this report supports these diagnoses and recommendations when possible,
given the data available. Elsewhere this report highlights their conjectural nature in some
instances, and in others suggests further research needed to make these conjectures more
precise.9
2. The Facts and Mechanisms
2.1 Aggregate Volatility
Volatility of the real side of the economy remains high.  While panels (a) and (b) in
Figure 1 highlight the clear success in terms of increased growth and dramatic inflation
stabilization attained during the post-convertibility period (delimited by a vertical line in
the figures), panel (c) shows that output volatility has not been tamed. The last panel
portrays the rate of GDP growth minus the average growth rate for the corresponding
period (pre- and post-convertibility). Not only has volatility remained high,  but the
relative contribution of deep crises (skewness), as opposed to a regular business cycle,
has risen.
Figure 1: Growth and Volatility: Pre vs. Post-Convertibility

































































































































































































































































Notes: Pre-convertibility period: 1981-1990. Post-convertibility period: 1991-1999. Used preliminary data for 1998 and predicted
data for 1999.
Source: IFS.10
There have been two sharp crises during the post-convertibility phase, as shown
by panel (a) in Figure 2. The Industrial Production Index dips following the Mexican
crisis at the end of 1994, and it does so again after the Asian crisis, gradually at first, and
then with increasing strength as the Russian and Brazilian crises intensify. Panel (b)
shows the path of unemployment and underemployment, both building up as structural
reforms take place and then being sharply boosted by the “Tequila” crisis. Due to the
normal lags in the response time of unemployment to a crisis, we probably have not yet
seen the worst unemployment numbers brought about by the current crisis.
Figure 2: Post-Convertibility Crises















































































































































































































































































































Notes: Industrial production data from  Estudio  Broda. Underemployment includes both “demandantes de  empleo” and “no
demandantes de empleo”.
Source: Estudio Broda, and INDEC.
2.2 Weak International Financial Links and Other External Shocks
The relatively small size of emerging economies’ current account deficits is a perennial
indication of their limited access to international capital markets. Argentina is no
exception; its current accounts deficit has never exceeded four percent of GDP during the
1990s, despite the fact that its average growth rate has exceeded five percent, more than
double that of the OECD nations during the same period.11
With respect to aggregate volatility, however, it is not only the level but also the
fragility in this limited access which matters. Panel (a) in Figure 3 illustrates the path of
capital flows to Argentina, and their close connection with the two crises of the 1990s,
especially the “tequila” episode. Stark as it is, this figure underestimates the severity of
the external constraint during crises since it ignores strained renegotiations and other
mechanisms that smooth capital flows movements.
2 Some of the underestimate can be
determined from price data; the thick line in panel (b) shows the price index of Argentine
sovereign debt, which exhibits dramatic drops around the crises dates.
Figure 3: External Conditions During Latest Crises
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Terms of trade Export prices Import prices
Source: Capital inflows from IFS (columns 78bcd and 78bjd). Panel (b): Spread of Brady bonds yeld vs. US benchmark (30 years).
Latin is the average of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. Source: Datastream.. International prices from INDEC.
                                               
2 The capital flows reversal during the last crisis can be seen more clearly in the non-financial private
sector, where they came down to US$2.7 billion in 1998, from US$8.2 billion the previous year. Official
flows rose, on the other hand, supported by loans from the World Bank and IADB.12
The thin line in the same panel portrays the price index of Latin American
sovereign debt. The high correlation between this series and Argentina’s does not free
Argentina from its share of responsibility for the weak nature of its international financial
links, but it does illustrate that the shocks are not a purely domestically-driven
phenomenon.
Panel (c) plots the terms of trade, export prices, and import prices, respectively. It
is apparent that while these helped Argentina during the tequila crisis and its recovery
phase, they have negatively affected it during the recent crisis.
3 However, since
Argentina is a fairly closed economy it is highly unlikely that terms of trade and
competitiveness shocks can be responsible for anything significant, unless leveraged
many times by the other problems highlighted here.
At a more conjectural level, Figure 4 illustrates yet another dimension of the weak
and volatile international financial links. Panel (a) uses U.S. stock returns data to
illustrate the variance of returns over a three-month-period centered on the indicated date.
The thick line corresponds to a prime-firms’ index (S&P100), while the other two
represent more inclusive indices (S&P400 and S&P600). As one would expect, the more
inclusive indices are more volatile, especially at times of aggregate turbulence and
distress, reflecting the greater vulnerability of smaller firms. Panel (c) is similar but
illustrates a 12-month period. This sensible volatility ranking is in sharp contrast with that
found in Argentina.
Despite the fact that the relative vulnerability of small firms is at least as large in
Argentina (see below) as in the U.S., the pattern of relative volatility portrayed in panels
(a) and (c) is reversed for Argentina. This can be seen in panels (b) and (d), which plot
with a thick line the variance series for the  MERVAL (Argentine prime-companies
index) and with a thin line that of the a more comprehensive index (IGPSA). One
                                               
3 In a closely related point, many have argued that had it not been for the massive overvaluation of Brazil at
the time of the “tequila” crisis, Argentina’s currency board system would have collapsed then.13
interpretation of this finding is that foreign investors focus mainly on the MERVAL, and
hence it is mostly these stocks that reflect large capital flows swings.
4
Figure 4: Variance of stock returns. United States vs. Argentina






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:  Stock market data from Datastream.
Finally, Table 1 compares the performance of several Argentine sovereign bonds
with that of several U.S. corporate bonds of equivalent rating. The conclusions must be
interpreted cautiously, since it is difficult to assess the relative diversification features of
these different bonds and spreads, and it is also well known that the volatility of “junk”
bonds varies over time. This said, the results are stark enough to support the
                                               
4 Another interpretation is that the finding is spurious, as the more comprehensive series is polluted by too
many no-trades. Although this remains as a possibility, aggregate volume data for both indices do not
reveal a pronounced relative decline of transactions in the IGPSA. It is also important to realize what the
relative-volatility claim in the text is not about: it does not say that large firms’ financing is more distressed
than that of smaller firms during crises. Indeed, reality is quite the opposite, as concerned local banks
reallocate their loans toward larger companies. It just says that an important segment of the demand for the
shares of prime companies fluctuates with international sentiment about emerging markets.14
interpretation that Argentina’s bonds’ returns are “excessively” volatile.  The table
reports the average spreads of these instruments over U.S. Treasury instruments, as well
as the variance of these spreads and that of their changes.
Table 1: Comparing Argentine Sovereign Bonds and U.S. Corporate Bonds of Similar Rating





BB- B1 4.28 2.25 0.36
BB Ba1 5.11 3.10 1.74




BB B1 4.59 4.12 1.76
Average 4.66 3.36 1.63
BB 1.92 0.48 0.07
BBB- B1 3.38 0.62 0.41
BB- B1 4.50 0.49 0.23
BB- B1 4.49 0.44 0.15
BB- 3.17 1.32 0.48
BB 2.97 0.67 0.10
BB- B1 3.36 1.02 0.28
U.S. Corporate
Bonds
BB- 4.91 6.51 2.13
Average 3.59 1.44 0.48
Notes:  Spread average means average over bond lifetime (or starting at earliest date available in Datastream). Argentine Sovereign
Bonds: ARGENTINA-PAR G/R 93-23, ARGENTINA 11 3/8% 97-17, ARGENTINA 11% 96-06, ARGENTINA 8 3/8% 93-03.
U.S. Corporate Bonds: FRUIT OF THE LOOM 7% 81-11, MAXUS ENERGY CORP. DEB 8 1/2% 89-08, SEA CONTAINERS
12 1/2% 93-04 (B), SEA CONTAINERS 12 ½% 92-04 (A), AK STEEL HOLDING CORP. 10 3/4% 94-04, CLARK OIL
REFINING 9 1/2% 92-04, BETHLEHEM STL.CORP. DEB 8.45% 86-05, TRSP.MARITIMA MEXICO 9 1/4% 93-03.
Source: Bond data from Datastream.
The evidence is quite clear: relative to U.S. corporate bonds, Argentine bonds pay
a higher spread and their returns are substantially more volatile. Moreover, the spread-
premium is probably a result of this “excess volatility.” As Figure 3 has shown, the bulk
of this volatility comes from episodes when financial markets tighten for emerging
markets. Argentine bonds look “illiquid” from the point of view of spreads and volatility,
despite the fact that their volume is often much larger that that of the specific U.S.
corporate bonds described in the table.15
In sum, the level of capital flows is low.
5 The volatility of terms of trade and
competitiveness does not seem large enough to justify the volatility of these flows and
their price, unlike that of U.S. prime-firms’ stocks (which are the target of foreign
investors) are more volatile than more comprehensive stock indices. Finally, Argentine
bonds pay a higher spread and are more volatile than U.S. corporate bonds of comparable
credit rating. While each piece of evidence is only “circumstantial,” these data appear to
add up to a convincing case that the connection of Argentina with international financial
markets is weak.
2.3 Domestic Amplification Mechanisms
2.3.1 The Credit Crunch and Financial Underdevelopment Problem
In general, the development of domestic financial markets is instrumental not only in
fostering investment and growth, but also in aggregating resources in times of distress.
Underdeveloped financial markets limit the prompt reallocation of resources and, as a
result, cause wasteful contractions in those most affected by shocks or those less plugged
into the financial pipelines. On the other hand, as financial development rises so does
leverage, and with it the fragility of the system to shocks to the financial system also
rises.  As the next paragraphs suggest, Argentina has suffered from both maladies during
the 1990s.
Figure 5 highlights Argentina’s “level problem.” Regardless of how it is
measured, and despite significant improvements over the last decade, Argentina’s
financial markets and level of financial intermediation are sub-standard. M3, loans, and
stock market capitalization–all listed as a fraction of GDP–fare poorly, both within the
region and certainly with respect to OECD economies.
6
                                               
5 It is worth highlighting, nonetheless, that Argentina has been given “the benefit of the doubt” in terms of
its ability and willingness to repay beyond that of the typical emerging economy. See the discussion of this
issue in the concluding section.
6 Although the comparison with Mexico may seem favorable, one has to consider that Mexico’s banking
sector was severely damaged by the “tequila” crisis.16













M3 Claims on Private Sector Stock Market Capitalization
Notes: Data as of end of 1997.
Source: M3 and loans to private from IFS. Stock market capitalization from Datastream (broad but not
complete coverage).
In one way or another, domestic financial markets have played an important role
during the two crises of the 1990s. Figure 6 highlights the “cyclical problem.” Panel (a)
illustrates the path of deposits and loans, while panel (b) depicts the paths of the rate of
growth of deposits minus the interest rate paid on deposits, and of the rate of growth of
loans minus the lending rate. Albeit imperfect, these measures capture banks’ and firms’
flow availability and needs.  The story behind the tequila crisis episode is clear and well
known: fears that the convertibility system would not survive led to a run on banks and
on the monetary base. As a result, there was a massive credit crunch despite the astute use
of the few degrees of freedom with monetary policy allowed by the convertibility law.
7 It
is apparent from that episode that loans, especially to the private sector, took longer to
recover than deposits.  This slow recovery of loans was caused by the government’s
                                               
7 The Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) can buy Argentine treasury bonds denominated in
dollars (which are counted as reserves) as long as this does not lead to a decline in the ratio of international
reserves (net of these bonds) to base below 2/3.  Government notes in the BCRA rose by about 25 percent
from 1994 to 1995 (from 1901 to 2543 billion pesos), and have declined sharply since then.17
crowding out (see below) as it borrowed to pay back for its “monetary” intervention, and
by the sharp consolidation process following the crisis that affected the Argentine (if it
can be called such, since it is mostly foreign by now) banking sector.
Figure 6: Behavior of Private-Sector Deposits and Loans


















































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: In panel (b), the term “effective” refers to the fact that corresponding interest rates were substracted from the growth rates.
CD rates (30-59 days) were used as deposit rates. Credit-line rates were used as loan rates.
Source: BCRA.
Prompted by the deep economic distress experienced during the tequila crisis,
Argentina mounted a massive effort to improve the liquidity position of banks and the
financial system as a whole. Not only were banks’ liquidity requirements raised (in effect
providing self-insurance), but explicit insurance features were introduced through a series
of domestic as well as international “repo” facilities. The effort paid off, as there were no
traces of systemic bank runs during the recent crisis, and lending slowed down but not
nearly as sharply as during the previous crisis.
8
For several reasons, the aggregate figure on loans is somewhat misleading
regarding the extent to which reduced domestic  intermediation and financial distress
contributed the sharp decline in real activity during the recent crisis. First, the increase in
financial depth during the last five years has in all likelihood made the economy more
                                               
8 See Figure 3 in Powell (1999) for clear evidence on the improved systemic liquidity of the Argentine
financial system. As described in that figure, starting from January of 1996, liquidity requirement increased
steadily from 10 percent of deposits to over 15 percent by March of 1999.  Excess reserves add a more or
less constant 10 percent, and the “repo” program adds yet another 10 percent starting in January of 1997.18
credit dependent. Second, the expected deflation required to adjust the real exchange rate
within the context of the convertibility-law points at a real interest rate that rose more
than nominal rates did.  This is confirmed by panel (a) in Figure 7, which reports the
monthly path of the nominal rates on 30-day peso loans to prime firms and, more
significantly, the same rate minus a measure of expected inflation in producer price
indices (see note in figure).
Figure 7: Interest Rates


































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: (a) Annualized 30-day peso loans to prime firms. Real interest rate calculated by subtracting annualized, centered, 6-month
PPI inflation from nominal rate. (b) Interquantile range 75%-25% of cross section of nominal interest rates on 30-day peso
loans.
Sources: interest rates from BCRA, PPI from INDEC.
It is apparent that the surge in nominal rates during the current crisis significantly
underestimates the producers’ perceived cost of credit. Third, the composition of
borrowers and lenders may have changed significantly during the crisis. Panel (b) in
Figure 7 shows the increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of prime loan rates which,
while not nearly as large as those in the tequila crisis, probably reflects widespread local
financial bottlenecks. Along the same lines, Figure 8 reports the reallocation of deposits
and loans within the banking sector toward the larger banks. This probably resulted in a
credit crunch on the clients of smaller banks, which are likely to be biased toward small
and medium-sized enterprises (abbreviated in Spanish as PYMES). This negative picture
for the PYMES is worsened by the fact that large firms, facing more difficult prospects in
international financial markets, turned to domestic financial markets and banks for19
their financial needs (see the next section’s discussion of this “crowding-out”
mechanism). These two facts combined probably explain why the share of loans made by
large banks continued to rise over the period.













Dec-96 Dec-97 Nov-98 Dec-98 Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99
Loans      Deposits
Notes: Size determined by assets.
Source: BCRA. Data for Dec-96 and Nov-98 was obtained from an earlier report. Comparisons between the
two sets of data should be done with caution.
Figure 9 shows the path of a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of the stock
market returns for a group of twenty industries (thick line).
9 The figure demonstrates the
dramatic surge in this cross-sectional dispersion during the crises.
10 As a comparison, the
thin line illustrates the path of the same cross-sectional dispersion measure for Chile,
which was affected by the same external shocks responsible for Argentina’s crisis. Chile,
                                               
9 The industries correspond to the stock market subsectors at level of disaggregation 5 of the Datastream
classification, which includes 116 potential entries. For Argentina and Chile, twenty-six and twenty sectors,
respectively, were represented during the period considered. Similar results were obtained by using
different measures of dispersion.
10 See  Aguiar and  Broner (1999) for an interesting and suggestive study of  sectoral stock indices in
Argentina and Mexico during the periods surrounding the crises of the 90s. Among other things, they
illustrate the negative correlation between sectors’ relative stock-return during crises, and these sectors’
relative responsiveness to interest rates and credit variables during tranquil times.20
a country with deeper financial markets, exhibited a much milder increase in dispersion,
suggesting that resource aggregation does play an important role in limiting the damage
caused by crises.
11 Finding more direct evidence of this mechanism is an important
research theme, as is the analysis of the effects of financial underdevelopment on the
relative size and volatility of traditionally credit-users sectors.
12






































































































































































Notes: Interquantile range 15%-85% (3-month MA). See footnote 10 in the text.
Source: Datastream.
In summation, regardless of how it is measured, and despite significant progress
which is likely to continue into the future, the depth of Argentina's financial markets and
financial  intermediation is significantly  suboptimal. Banks were at the center of the
                                               
11 Of course the argument is somewhat circular. One could argue that the shocks were larger for Argentina,
hence the larger increase in dispersion–although it seems difficult to argue that by late 1998 Chile had been
affected by a smaller terms of trade shock than Argentina. The implicit argument in the text, on the other
hand, is that the shocks were of similar magnitude, but that the relative weaknesses of Argentina, including
its sound (during recent crisis) but underdeveloped financial sector, were partly responsible for a larger
response.21
problem during the tequila crisis, when a run on deposits generated a massive credit
crunch, and their lending behavior, as well as the internal reallocation of deposits, has not
helped to smooth the current crisis. The increased dispersion of sectoral returns hints at
the presence of significant problems with the aggregation and distribution of financial
resources during crises. The crowding-out and collateral squeeze mechanisms described
below reinforce this problem as they encourage a pronounced “flight-to-quality” process
during crises.
2.3.2 The Crowding-Out Problem
Everywhere in the world, credit contractions cause the most damage to small and medium
size firms, which have only a few financing options, often limited to a bank or two. How
severe the crunch on these firms is depends not only on the behavior of banks, but also on
the “quality” of the borrowers who become the primary target of overly-concerned banks’
lending activity. Thus, crowding-out involves not only the government, but also the
prime firms of the country.
The Government. Standard macroeconomic stabilization arguments indicate that fiscal
deficits ought to be counter-cyclical. Latin American economies, unlike OECD nations,
typically exhibit the opposite pattern; fiscal deficits are pro-cyclical rather than counter-
cyclical.
13  This pattern has been interpreted as a seriously sub-optimal policy, and most
likely the result of the financial constraints faced by the governments themselves. This
assessment may be true, but it misses an important point: if external financial shocks are
an important source of fluctuations, the economy should distribute the scarce available
international resources across domestic economic agents so as to smooth their differences
in financial distress. It is highly unlikely that government expenditure, unless used very
selectively to solve financial distress in the private sector, is the right place to allocate the
                                                                                                                                           
12 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a comparison of relative sectoral size among OECD nations, and for
evidence on the connection between this and the degree of development of local financial markets. A
related theme worth exploring is that of the composition, as opposed to the level, of available domestic
financial instruments. Is this composition very different from that of OECD nations’–e.g., in terms of the
ratio of short and long term loans and bonds–and if so, which sectors and firms are most likely to suffer
from such bias?
13 See, e.g., IPES (1997) for a discussion of the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal deficits in Latin America.22
marginal dollar.
14 Fiscal policy may need to be pro-cyclical after all.
15 Panel (a) in Figure
10 illustrates the path of Argentina’s fiscal deficit, and its decomposition between the
primary deficit and debt service. It is apparent that the fiscal side does not share in the
adjustment. Panel (b) reports amortizations, which while generating no new net financing
demand, add to the strain and uncertainty associated with large repayments due.
Figure 10: Public Finance
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Public deficit      Primary deficit      Interest payments








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Notes: In panel (a), semester quantities were annualized. In addition, for years 1993-1995 semester data was not available and thus
annual quantities were repeated for both semesters. 1999 data is predicted.
Source:: INDEC
The lack of fiscal adjustment is not the only important dimension. One of the
main features of financial crises is that funds lose their  fungibility. It is no longer
irrelevant where the government gets its funding. The first dimension to consider is
whether the funding comes from domestic or foreign markets. Except for extreme cases
of lack of fiscal discipline, which is not the case of Argentina today, it is the government
that normally has the most opportunity to access international financial markets. Thus,
the government should shift its financing away from domestic markets. Both the
information on stocks (panel a) and flows (panel b) in Figure 11 reflect that the Argentine
                                               
14 This also suggests that fiscal adjustments during crises ought to be carried out on the expenditure side
rather than the tax side. If the latter is unavoidable, these adjustments should probably be targeted away
from the supply side of the economy.
15 This is an optimal policy argument, as opposed to the more standard argument that explains the fiscal
pattern in terms of the financial constraints faced by the government itself. Which effect dominates depends
on whether the private sector (perhaps a specific sector within it) or the government faces the tightest
financial constraints during the crisis.23
government has not succeeded in doing so during the current crisis. While there has been
a decline in the relative growth of domestic as compared to external debt, the positive
numbers in 1995 probably reflects a general contraction of domestic financial markets
rather than a voluntary retrenchment–a conjecture supported by Figure 12 (b) below.
Figure 11: Public Financing Through Domestic Markets
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Source: INDEC.
International crowding out is probably not too important.
16 This is true
particularly because, as panel (a) in figure 12 illustrates, a significant share of
government’s borrowing abroad during crises comes from international organizations,
which are probably more difficult to access directly by the private sector.
17  Conversely,
domestic crowding out can be significant. Who buys the domestic debt, and whether
these sources are available to the private sector as well, are important questions. In
particular, does the government facilitate a “flight-to-quality” process? Panel (b)
illustrates the share of domestic resources that come from banks and other domestic
financial institutions or from AFJPs. Panel (c) shows the percentage of  AFJPs assets
allocated to government instruments (the maximum allowed is 50%).
18 Panel (d) shows
                                               
16 The opposite could conceivably occur during crises. The government’s success in placing debt in
international markets, as well as its “road-shows,” may facilitate the private sector’s access to these
markets.
17 Of course, it would have been better had the government borrowed those resources not to solve its own
fiscal imbalances, but to support a financially distressed private sector.
18 It is difficult to tell from this figure how much of the fluctuation in allocations is due to volumes and how
much is due to prices.24
net public borrowing from banks as a percentage of bank credit to the private sector. It is
apparent from the figure that during the tequila crisis the government turned to the
domestic banks for financing, and in fact much of the slow recovery of loans to the
private sector, which was slower than that of deposits, can be attributed to this shift.
However, during the recent episode the government seems to have redirected its
financing efforts toward the AFJPs, which can now absorb larger volumes of bonds than
they did in 1995.
Figure 12: Public Sector Crowding Out
(a) Public Debt from International Organizations and Official Creditors
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Source: Panel (a): INDEC. Panel (b): INDEC and SAFJP. Panel (c): SAFJP. After Dec-98, only have national government’s bonds.
“Pasted” the two series. For early years, only data for June and December are available. Panel (d): BCRA.
Large firms. There are many dimensions along which large domestic firms play a role
similar to that of the government. For example, their financial and productive health is
important to the country’s international image, a point to which I return in the policy
section. The most significant similarity in this section, however, is the crowding out of25
PYMEs from domestic financial markets. As external financing tightens for large firms,
they turn to domestic markets as preferred customers, exacerbating the ongoing “flight-
to-quality” process. The social cost of this strategy, nonetheless, is that PYMEs generally
do not have access to international financial markets, regardless of price.
Figure 13: Prime Firms Crowding Out
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Oct-98 Nov-98 Dec-98 Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99
All banks      Top 10
Notes: (a) Average implicit return on non-Brady sovereign bonds. Average implicit return on bonds of top Argentine companies. (YPF
Sociedad Anonima 8% 1994-2004, Banco de Galicia 9% 1993-2003, Banco Rio de la Plata 8 3/4% 1993-2003)
Source: Panel (a): Datastream. Prime rate for 30-days bank loans in US dollars: BCRA, Panel (b): Ministry of Economy. (c) Source
BCRA.
Panel (a) in Figure 13 illustrates the path of several dollar interest rates in order to
capture, albeit imperfectly, the cost of credit for prime Argentine firms. The solid lines
correspond to sovereign and corporate bonds rates, while the dashed line represents a
benchmark short-term rate, namely the domestic rate on 30-day bank loans in dollars.
While it is apparent that during the credit crunch of the early crisis the domestic cost of26
credit rose significantly for prime firms, in the most recent episode the opposite has
occurred, perhaps reflecting the unraveling of a considerable domestic flight-to-quality.
19
Panel (b) shows the path of the non-financial sector’s foreign borrowing, while
panel (c) portrays the share of commercial loans allocated to small loans. The former
panel shows that whereas, during the 1995 crisis most of the decline in capital flows
occurred in the financial private sector (see Figure 3), it has been the non-financial
private sector (in all likelihood, large corporations) that has shown the largest decline in
capital inflows during the current crisis. The bottom panel, on the other hand, reflects a
decline in the share of small loans during the current crisis, particularly by large banks.
Both of these developments suggest a relative tightening for smaller firms.
20
To summarize, while aware of the acute problems caused by domestic crowding
out during crises, the government has not been able to avoid it. During the crisis of 1995
and the subsequent recovery, the government tapped on the domestic banks, while during
the current crisis it turned to the AFJPs and domestic financial markets. Large firms, at
least during the current crisis, seem to have behaved similarly and turned their demand
for credit inwards, perhaps aided by an all-too-willing and conservative domestic banking
sector.
2.3.3 The Inflexibility Problem (Claustrophobia)
While the credit crunch experienced by the Argentine economy during 1995 could
probably not have been averted by a more flexible real wage, it is probably true that in
the current episode such rigidity enhanced the crisis by generating a “collateral squeeze”
(that is, a decline in the appeal of the firm’s outlook from the point of view of the
banks).
21
Although significant reforms are underway, Argentina has European-style labor
market institutions and traditions. On one hand, the faster growth of Argentina relative to
                                               
19 While the secondary market price of bonds may not reflect the cost of new financing, the qualitative
feature of the figure, at least across the two crises, should be robust to these differences.
20 The last two paragraphs hint at another potentially interesting research theme: That of the behavior of
large firms during crises, and their role in smoothing or amplifying them.
21 Of course, one could argue that with real wage flexibility, particularly through exchange rate flexibility,
the run on deposits and the ensuing credit crunch perhaps would have been avoided altogether.27
Europe may make these institutions more bearable. More importantly, labor market
rigidities combined with the problems described above generate a significantly more
disturbing scenario. When dealing with large external shocks and unyielding fiscal
pressure, firms are severely squeezed from two complementary ends: financial and labor
markets.
There are many forms of labor market rigidities, not all of which have the same
costs in terms of aggregate volatility. Ultimately, nonetheless, an inflexible labor market
yields costs of labor, not all of which come in the form of wages, that are too slow to
adapt to sharp downturns. While in theory these frictions are mostly real, in practice
nominal and real factors are easily confounded, particularly in the face of rapidly
changing nominal events. It is in this context that allowing the currency to depreciate
may in some circumstances generate some “breathing space.”
22  Mexico’s devaluation
during the tequila crisis reduced manufacturing real unit costs by nearly twenty five
percent in 1995, a gain that had not been undone even as late as 1998 (last observation).
While real wage rigidities are often the chief concern in a scenario with hard labor
market institutions, the combination of extremely low world inflation with the fixed
exchange rate built into the currency board, poses a question which was almost
unthinkable a decade ago in Argentina: Is it possible that the “psychological” zero wage-
inflation floor has become a chief constraint during this crisis?
Figure 14 seems to support this nominal-rigidity conclusion.  Panel (a) portrays
the year-to-year rate of inflation in producers’ prices and nominal wages. With a little bit
of imagination, one can see the price-inflation series as a straight downward-sloping line,
crossing zero with no difficulty. Despite the conventional wisdom on the matter, this
decline is not purely due to the sharp decline in primary goods’ prices (see panel b).
23
Going back to panel (a), the wage-inflation series comes down early on as well, but then
“flattens at zero.”
                                               
22 Of course, there are costs associated with a currency depreciation as well; particularly on the financial
side where balance sheets and collateral may be severely harmed by a sudden change in the exchange rate
(see Caballero and Krishnamurthy 1998). There is no doubt that in Argentina today these costs overwhelm
any potential benefits from a devaluation.  This will be discussed further in the policy section.
23 The CPI, on the other hand, behaves much like wages. Why there is so much difference between CPI and
PPI is an important research question.28
Figure 14: Wages and Inflation
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Notes: (a) and (b): Yearly inflation for previous 12 months. (c): Decomposition based on 24-sector  disaggredated data.
Compositional effect computed keeping previous period sectoral wages constant, wage changes computed keeping sectoral
composition constant. (d): First average obtained eliminating the top and bottom 15% of the distribution.
Source: Ministry of Economy and INDEC.
Indeed, this description does not require much imagination, but for the wage-
deflation of 1996. However,  panels (c) and (d) account for most of the 1996 wage
deflation in terms of a compositional effect and a few outliers.
24 The former panel breaks
down the path of wage inflation into a compositional effect (thin-solid line), where wages
are kept fixed within each sector but relative employment is allowed to change, and the
complement, which captures the pure wage effect.  The point worth noting is that about a
third of the wage deflation can be captured by compositional effects.
                                               
24 These are outliers not in the sense of measurement error, but in that nominal rigidities are not very
relevant for sectors in deep distress and with high turnover rates (e.g., construction).29
The thick-solid line in panel (d) explains the rest. It represents the mean of the
distribution of cross sectional wage inflation once fifteen percent of the observations
from each tail have been removed. The figure shows that sharp wage disinflations in a
few sectors account for much of the overall wage deflation during 1996 that was left
unexplained by compositional effects alone.
25
Claustrophobia. The relative rigidity of wages in Argentina during crises
underestimates the extent of the relative rigidity of the Argentine system. On one hand,
countries with more flexible exchange rate systems may choose not to utilize this
flexibility as much in the midst of a crisis, when controlled devaluations are risky to play
with.
26 On the other hand, and more significantly, in Argentina lack of real exchange rate
adjustment today comes along with lack of adjustment in the near future as well. The
perceived present value of overvaluations relative to crisis overvaluations is likely to be
higher in the Argentine system. This concept is difficult to measure, although some
information can be obtained from peso-dollar spreads, stock markets and real activity.
Much has been said about the advantage of a fully credible exchange rate for the
peso-dollar spread. This is supported by the top panel of Figure 15, which illustrates the
path of nominal interest rates in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, most of which is indeed
tied to the uncertainty surrounding the respective currencies. But there is another facet to
this: the credibility of the exchange rate also means that the exchange rate is not expected
to adjust in the near future even if doing so would help during the recovery. That is, a
crisis that brings about a perceived overvaluation (e.g., as a result of a devaluation by
neighbors or a large terms-of-trade shock) has no hope of being resolved quickly.  This
depresses effective loan demand, both for purely neoclassical as well as financial
constraint reasons.  These circumstances may be part of the reason why it is not only the
peso-dollar spread that does not rise as much in Argentina, but also that the real interest
rate level remains more subdued.
                                               
25 This discussion hints at a potentially interesting research question for Argentina: How does the path of
the histogram of microeconomic wage changes vary as inflation is gradually brought down by the
convertibility system? See Card and Hyslop (1995) for U.S. evidence on nominal-wage-decline-resistance
at the microeconomic level.
26 See Hausmann et al. (1999) for preliminary but suggestive evidence on devaluation “refrainment.”30
Figure 15: Relative Performance: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Panel (a): Inter-bank interest rates from BCRA, Federal funds rate from Banco Central do Brasil, and inter-bank interest
rates from Banco de Mexico. Panel (b) Source: Datastream. Panel (c) Sources: INDEC, Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de
Mexico.
Thus, just comparing interest rates is not the proper measure of the relative
distress across economies with different exchange rates systems and degree of labor
market rigidities.  The relation between these rates and the real side of the economy
changes across these systems.
27 Panel (b) in Figure 15 shows that despite its better
performance in terms of interest rates, the Argentine stock market did not perform as
well, even when compared with Brazil, which was the regional epicenter of the current
crisis. The bottom panel of the figure reinforces this conclusion by showing that
                                               
27 There is some similarity between this claim and the “covert” rigidity result in Caballero and Hammour
(1996). In that case, rigidities in the labor market were responsible for sharp unemployment spikes during
recessions, while leaving no traces on the path of the real wage. In that case, the hiring rate fell excessively,
dragging the wage down as a result. The analogue here is the sharp decline in investment and collateral
(thus an increase in credit rationing) which keeps the interest rate subdued.31
industrial production did not fare well in Argentina, either. Perhaps most significantly,
while there is a sense that the other countries, especially Mexico, have left the worst
behind, Argentina is still trapped in a highly uncertain scenario. The question arises
whether the relative calm during the crisis has come at the cost of a slower recovery, and
whether that was indeed anticipated by economic agents.
28
To summarize, not only does the real wage seem to accommodate shocks less in
Argentina than in other similarly distressed economies, perhaps due to a combination of
real rigidities and exchange rate inflexibility, but a wage-deflation floor also seems to be
taking its toll. Finally, there is very suggestive evidence that the relationship between
interest rates and the real side changes significantly in the rigid Argentine system;
judging the success of the system by the reduced volatility of its rates may thus be
misguided.
3. Taking Stock
The diagnostic contains four basic elements: (i) limited and fragile links with
international financial markets; (ii) domestic financial underdevelopment and recurrent
credit crunches; (iii) a public debt problem with a multiple-layers crowding-out
mechanism; and (iv) a claustrophobic system where real wage inflexibility is maximized
by the combined effect of a rigid labor market, low world inflation and the convertibility
law.
In accordance with these elements, the general policy recommendations
highlighted in the introduction were grouped into four categories as well: (i) improve
external financial links and their use during crises; (ii) continue and accelerate the
development of domestic financial markets and intermediation; (iii) reduce the public
debt burden; and (iv) develop reforms geared toward adding flexibility to labor costs,
while preserving–not changing–the current exchange rate system. All these measures
need to be combined with an attitude of “patience,” as the passage of time (without a
major disaster along the way) should ameliorate some of the problems. Perhaps most
                                               
28 Of course, presidential political uncertainty has not helped Argentina, either.32
prominently, the wage inflation “floor” which seems to be present at this time should
eventually subside as an institutional feature.
While at a general level the connection between recommendations and diagnostic
are apparent, there are specific aspects that are worth developing further.
3.1. Improving the Links with International Financial Markets
By now, there is a widespread consensus on a series of general recommendations to
improve these links, which can be found in most “international financial architecture”
pamphlets.  These include norms of transparency and accountability, banks’ sound
practices for supervision, settlement,  accounting and disclosure, aggregate risk
management, and a series of related measures and practices aimed at improving the
country’s contractual environment and corporate governance.
At a general level, these recommendations need to be followed closely if
international financial links are to be strengthened significantly. The recent Asian crisis
brought this important issue to the fore.  A recent example of the impact that good
corporate governance standards have on investors makes the point clearly: The Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund  (TIAA-CREF),
one of the largest institutional investors in the U.S. has made public that it simply does
not invest in claims issued by companies with poor corporate governance standards.
29
Among its requirements are that: (i) a company’s board consist of a substantial majority
of independent directors (i.e., with no significant personal ties, current or past…); (ii) a
company’s board must obtain shareholders approval for actions that could alter the
fundamental relationship between shareholders and the board; and (iii) companies must
base executive compensations on a “pay for performance” system, and should provide
full and clear disclosure of all significant compensation arrangements. It does not take
much knowledge of Latin American corporations to realize that very few of them would
make it onto TIAA-CREF’s good corporate governance list.
                                               
29 See pages 10-11 in the May 1999 issue of Participant, TIAA-CREF’s quarterly news and performance
magazine.33
Importing and adapting to local conditions the corresponding laws and regulations
from the developed world is probably the easiest step of all. The real obstacle is in their
enforcement, which not only requires competent and fair courts, but in many instances
also requires a deep “cultural” change.
In the meantime, arguably less important but more traditional factors also offer
significant room for improvement. These include all the other main policy
recommendations in this report, as reduced aggregate volatility and enhanced liquidity
are central ingredients in deepening financial markets and links, as well as others:
i)  Reducing the public debt problem would not only limit the volatility that
stems from the perception of a fragile fiscal position, but it would also
improve Argentina’s credit rating. Its below-investment-grade status
represents a major cost in terms of spreads and reduced participation of
foreign institutional investors. Moreover, by the sovereign-principle, this low
credit rating represents a major drag on the private sector’s access to
international financial markets as well. Table 2 illustrates this clearly, as
Moody’s rating sets at the sovereign ceiling most major Argentine
corporations.  S&P is a bit more lenient in the case of highly  dollarized
economies as it sees suspension of convertibility as an unlikely scenario; it is
still apparent in this rating, nonetheless, that the sovereign credit anchor
weighs heavily.
Table 2: Sovereign Credit Rating and Rating of Top Private Companies
Ratings Sovereign YPF Metrogas Telefónica Edenor Banco Rio
Perez
Companc
S&P BB BBB- N/A N/A BBB- BB+ N/A
Moody’s Ba3 Ba3 Ba3 Ba3 Ba3 Ba3 B1
Source: S&P and Moody’s.34
ii)  On a related point, large firms with access to international financial markets
constitute one of the main sources of international collateral for an emerging
country. Thus their credit ratings are “systemically” important as well, which
means that there is an argument for promoting good performance along these
lines.
30
iii)  Developing the domestic financial system and strengthening banks also would
improve international financial links through two channels: first, by reducing
overall volatility, and second, by increasing the country’s capacity to
intermediate foreign funds into PYMEs.
31,32
iv)  Naturally, improving labor costs flexibility would also reduce real volatility
and hence make Argentina’s claims more attractive.
v)  The exports sector needs to grow and diversify. Diversification helps directly
by reducing the variance of terms of trade. Growth improves the country’s
“collateral.” Although at the microeconomic level many international
financial transactions can be  collateralized (explicitly or implicitly) with
claims on non-tradables, as is often done with  repos  collateralized by
mortgages, at the aggregate level the country’s capacity to repay is an
important consideration. While Argentina’s foreign indebtedness as a fraction
of its GDP is very reasonable, it is not so as a fraction of its exports. The same
holds true for the country’s flows. Large ratios of debt and current account
deficits over exports can be thought of as a very illiquid and leveraged
position before the rest of the world.  In light of this, Figure 16 shows that the
world’s financial markets have certainly “trusted” Argentina more than they
are typically willing to do with emerging economies. While panels (a) and (c)
show that Argentine foreign debt and current account deficits are quite
                                               
30 Understanding the impact of large firms’ health and performance on the international perception of a
country’s international collateral value seems, in many respects, as important as the much more extensively
studied role of the government’s health in such perceptions. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998) for a
model of corporate-based international collateral.
31 During the 1990s, over one third of Argentina’s private sector international bonds have been issued by
the financial sector. Interestingly, this share fell to only ten percent during the tequila crisis.
32 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998) for a formal framework that highlights the harmful interactions
between fragile links with international financial markets and underdeveloped domestic financial markets.35
moderate when compared with that of other emerging economies, this is not
the case once they are normalized by exports, as is shown in panels (b) and
(d). External Argentine debt is 3.5 times its exports, probably a world record
among substantially developed economies.
The possibility of forming a Latin American market with homogeneous financial
instruments should be considered. The additional liquidity that a larger market would
bring is a significant enhancement from the point of view of large foreign investors
In the meantime, the combination of weak international links, underdeveloped
domestic financial markets and intermediation offers a clear case for taxing capital flows
and mandating liquidity provisions.
33  However, one of the major costs of such policies is
that they may further reduce the liquidity of Argentine asset markets. Measures of this
type should be considered only in conjunction with measures aimed at fostering the
development of these markets
                                               
33 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998) for a formal argument justifying this recommendation. In that
paper, we show that weak international financial links alone are not enough to justify such intervention. It
is the domestic markets problem, which leads to an undervaluation of international collateral provision.36
Figure 16: External Debt Burden and Current Account Deficit









Argentina Brazil Mexico Chile Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Thailand










Argentina Brazil Mexico Chile Costa Rica Korea, Rep. Thailand











Argentina Brazil Chile Korea, Rep. Mexico Thailand
1994 1995 1996 1997








Argentina Brazil Chile Korea, Rep. Mexico Thailand
1994 1995 1996 1997
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) 1997 data.
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance 1999.
3.2. Fostering Domestic Financial Markets and Credit Flows
At a general level, the institutional and contractual reforms, as well as the stabilization
measures described above, should have a direct impact on the development of domestic
financial markets. In addition, there are a few considerations that concern domestic
markets and banks particularly.
While the efficiency and direct costs of the Chilean private pension system are
still a matter of debate, there is no doubt that the system had an enormous and positive
impact on the development of domestic equity markets. Market capitalization over GDP
hovers around a hundred percent today, whereas two decades ago it was non-existent.
34
                                               
34 However, see a companion report on Chile (Caballero 2000) for an important caveat on its high
capitalization value based on the fact that its turnover ratio is unusually low.37
There is no reason why AFJPs could not do the same in Argentina, except perhaps for the
large share of their resources which is being absorbed by public instruments.
More generally, institutional investors play a central role in the development of
domestic financial markets. Both their participation and their willingness to bid for long-
term instruments depends on macroeconomic stability, as well as on the existence of an
appropriate regulatory environment for these institutions. Since they can average
illiquidity risks better than individual investors can, institutional investors naturally
exploit the longer end of the maturity structure. The development of markets for long-
term debt is of vital importance to Argentina, as well as the rest of Latin America.
Moreover, institutional investors are likely to play a key role in promoting good corporate
governance practices, as the TIAA-CREF example above illustrates. This is an efficient
mechanism for delegating part of the monitoring and enforcement of good business
practices to the private sector. Needless to say, institutional investors themselves need to
be appropriately regulated and monitored.
35
Perhaps as a result of the fire sales brought about by the tequila crisis, the lion’s
share of the banking sector is now in the hands of foreigners. For the most part, this has
been hailed (if you can’t develop a good supervisory, import it!). Indeed, foreign banks in
Argentina today have their headquarters in countries with solid banking regulation. But
there is another aspect of the story that receives less attention and is in principle a source
of concern: In the event of a crisis, are their lending and investment practices similar to
those of domestic banks? In particular, are they more inclined to halt lending at the first
sight of systemic trouble?  Do they lend mostly to prime firms, leaving PYMES more
unprotected? Or do they, by offering a perceived “safe haven,” facilitate a run on
domestic banks during crises? These are key issues that need to be sorted out and dealt
with, not in terms of limiting foreign banks’ participation but in ensuring that precautions
are taken against the potential side effects.
                                               
35 See Blommestein (1997).38
3.3. Controlling Fiscal Imbalances
In sharp contrast to the outstanding financial management of Argentina’s public debt in
recent years, the fiscal deficit has not been tamed. The situation is worse than it looks at
first glance, since a series of accounting “practices” have underestimated Argentine
public deficits.
36 Moreover, the health of the net asset position of the government today is
overestimated relative to its past, since it does not consider the decline in assets due to
privatizations.
37
Aside from the “standard” recommendation to improve a noticeably poor tax
collection record, there are at least two types of measures that, while clearly sub-optimal
in the long run, may prove helpful in attenuating the crowding out and image problems in
the short and medium run.  The first is the passage (perhaps temporarily, say for the next
five years) of a fiscal convertibility law, as is currently being discussed.  While the
availability of counter-cyclical fiscal policies is a blessing in normal,  OECD-like
circumstances, it is not of much use when the nature of the crisis is mostly one of loss of
confidence by international financial markets. Thus the cost of losing this policy tool
during the typical Argentine recession may not be large relative to the gains associated
with a healthy fiscal stance during good times.  A second possibility involves placing
limits on the  collateralizability of the provinces’ co-participation receipts. It is very
difficult for the government to control flows at any point in time if the provinces can
borrow around any federal tightening.
Having discussed the fiscal situation, one is compelled to point out that the level
of public debt over GDP in Argentina is not high relative to that of many developed
economies. It is certainly much lower than in Italy and Belgium, for example. This
seeming contradiction only highlights the large synergies between the different
ingredients discussed in this report. Indeed, the level of public debt over  GDP is a
                                               
36 Essentially, the public debt accumulated over the last decade is too large for the deficits reported. The
official explanation is that the difference is accounted by “under-the-line” items.
37 This is just an accounting statement, not an argument against privatization.39
misleading statistic when compared to more advanced economies, precisely because the
cost of servicing such debt is much higher in Argentina, especially during crises.
38
But why is such a low level of debt charged such high spreads? And why should it
be rated so low? There are at least two factors in the answers to these questions.
First, more advanced economies have a higher tax-yield than Argentina. Figure 17
shows that while the public debt to GDP ratio is significantly lower in Argentina than in
the U.S., for example, the ranking turns around once public debt is divided by fiscal
revenue rather than GDP. Since tax-yield is closely related to tax-capacity, the Argentine
government has access to a significantly lower share of GDP for repayments.
                                               
38 Nonetheless, Argentina’s efforts to lengthen the maturity of public debt have paid off in terms of the
costs of spikes. The amount of debt to be renewed in 1997 and 1998 was below 15% of the outstanding
debt, which means that the interest rate spikes can account only for a small fraction of the increase in the
ratio of interest payments to total debt observed during  the last four years (from 10% in 1995 to 13% in
1998). On the other hand, the longer maturity of debt (rising from 3.3 years in 1994 to 14.9 years in 1997)
associated with a steep yield curve surely contributed to this worrying trend (another important cause of the
increase in interest payments was the termination of a series of  concessional loans available from
international institutions. )  Apart from the clear advantages of an evenly spaced schedule of payments that
prevents disorderly confidence crisis, it is less clear what is the best maturity structure from the point of
view of the level and variability of interest payments for a country facing a high variability of international
interest rates and a steep yield curve, which moreover appears to steepen in crisis times. Back of the
envelope calculations show that the increases in the interest payments to debt ratio from 1995 to 1998 may
account for 5% of the existing debt stock in 1998.40
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Second, and perhaps more interestingly for its nearly self-fulfilling implications,
Argentine public debt is more illiquid and subject to highly volatile spreads, reflecting
many of the problems described in this report. One dimension of this  illiquidity is
illustrated by the third bars in Figure 17, which represent the size of public debt relative
to an indicator of domestic financial markets depth. Argentina’s fiscal position looks very
weak along this dimension.  This is important, since domestic markets are likely to
constitute the support market for such instruments (i.e., the market that stays even in bad
times).
3.4. Dealing with Inflexibility
Traditionally rigid and unionized Argentine labor markets are now facing an additional
constraint brought about by the need for nominal wage deflation during crises. Besides
the obvious volatility costs stemming from labor cost rigidities, there are indirect costs
which come from induced capital deepening. Such a strategy often brings about higher41
leverage ratios and more dependence on external financial flows, which are important
sources of volatility in themselves.
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The ongoing process of labor reform should help alleviate traditional real
rigidities. Perhaps a step back in terms of these reforms is the elimination of “temporary
contracts.” While such a measure seems appropriate in light of the unsuccessful European
experience with this form of contracts as a mechanism for fighting structural
unemployment, it may not be so if the main goal is to fight bursts in cyclical
unemployment during steep crises. The tension between structural damage and cyclical
benefits can be dealt with by making temporary contracts contingent on aggregate
conditions (i.e., only acceptable during recessions).
In the short run, reforms aimed at reducing the non-wage component of labor
costs should be fast-tracked, but this must be accompanied by offsetting fiscal
adjustments so as not to further expose a fragile fiscal situation. At this time, supply
incentives should have a higher payoff than demand incentives, justifying the tradeoff.
As for nominal rigidity, there is not much that can be done without incurring great
risks. Given the current exchange rate system, nominal rigidities will fade away with the
passage of time, and sustained low inflation, rather than with deregulation.
40 If it were not
for all the turmoil that discussing such a change would entail, I would argue that adding
two to three percent of rigidly automatic nominal depreciation to the peso over the dollar
might be reasonable anti-crisis insurance–at least while  OECD nations insist on
dangerously low inflation levels as their targets.
41  But for Argentina such an option is out
                                               
39 See Caballero and Hammour (1998a) for a discussion of the French capital deepening experience. This
represents another interesting research area for Argentina: is there an ongoing capital deepening process?
Does it show up in industries and sectors where labor protection and regulation is most severe? Are firms in
these sectors disproportionately responsible for Argentina’s leverage? And so on. Also, see Caballero and
Hammour (1998b) for a discussion of “elastification,” the process whereby regulated labor markets
eventually increase the employment response to changes in aggregate conditions, particularly as capital is
given new opportunities.
40 After the Brazilian devaluation, the Argentine authorities tried to compensate for it by moving forward
the reduction of employers’ contributions. Unfortunately, opportunities like this one cannot be counted on
in a long-term strategy.
41 See the concluding section of the project for a discussion of the desirable properties of exchange rate
systems that have strong long-term nominal anchors, cannot jump at high frequency, but allow some real
flexibility at high-to-medium frequencies. I refer to these somewhat utopian exchange rate systems as
anchored-viscous.42
of the question in the short and medium run. Any reversal in the exchange rate system
should be announced with years of warning to prevent major collateral damage and
disarray, and it should not take place until the fiscal situation is finally remedied if
inflationary expectations are to be contained.
What about the other extreme,  dollarization? When the decision seems to be
driven by short-term panic rather than a long-term perspective it is probably not a good
idea. While it has certainly been wise to discuss the issue in the midst of the crisis, it is
probably not a good idea to actually implement it. Given the near irreversibility of the
dollarization decision, it does not seem sound to adopt it unless long-run considerations
support it, and this is highly unlikely (at least as a unilateral measure). Moreover, the
short and medium term advantages of dollarization may have been exaggerated. First, the
argument that  dollarization will increase the appeal of Argentina’s assets to foreign
investors, while valid, is probably overoptimistic. With sovereign debt rated as it is, there
is not much room for improvement in corporate ratings either. Second, and related, the
idea that future seignorage could be used as public international collateral ignores the fact
that current reserves, especially those in T-bills, could play a similar role in the current
system. Third, while Argentina’s other fundamental problems are not fixed, the “desired”
equilibrium real exchange rate is bound to exhibit large fluctuations; thus it may not yet
be time to permanenently surrender nominal exchange rate flexibility. This is particularly
the case if dollarization is perceived as a substitute for deep reforms, a mistake that




1988-present: Opening to trade.
1991-1993: Major period of privatizations.
1990s: Income distribution worsens. Families below poverty line: 38.3% in October
1989, 11.9% in May 1994, 19% in October 1997. Real wages decline slightly.
1995-present: Share of foreign banks increases to 40%. Number of banks falls from 168
to 113 (1997).
1991-present: Stock market capitalization/GDP rises from 2.4% to 17% (1997).
1995-present: Pension funds US$9 billion.
1996-present: Investment funds rise from US$600 million to US$6 billion.
1990s: Massive capital inflows and corresponding increase in foreign reserves.
1990s: Pre-tequila expansion driven by consumption boom (until 1993). Post-tequila
expansion is driven by investment boom (beginning in 1994 and continuing after the
crisis). Manufacturing growth is below GDP growth in the pre-tequila period and above
GDP growth in the post-tequila.
Developments and Events
1989:
Overall: The foreign investment law is amended, and most investment barriers are lifted.
May: Menem is elected.
July: Alfonsin leaves office six months early due to hyperinflation.
July-December: Stabilization attempt ends in another hyperinflation.
August: Congress passes the Economic Emergency Law and Law for the Reform of the
State which, respectively, allow the government to take swift measures to stop
hyperinflation (cuts in expenditure, price controls, etc.) and to start a privatization
process.
September: Argentina reaches agreement with IMF and receives US$1.5 billion stand-by
loan.
October: CGT (major labor organization) splits.44
1990:
Overall: Tax penalty law is imposed.
January: Argentina experiences a drastic liquidity squeeze, unilaterally rescheduling
internal debt (10-year bonds for CDs).
March-December: Stabilization attempt ends in high inflation.
February: VAT for goods is introduced.
November: VAT for services is introduced.
1991:
Overall:  Federal government begins to devolve education and health services to the
provinces.
February: A new tax package eliminates export taxes and lowers taxes on financial
transactions.
March: Mercosur is established.
April: Convertibility begins. All outstanding domestic public debt is consolidated into
long-term bonds.
1992:
Overall: The CGT reunites, but the government is still able to keep labor movements
divided and ineffective.
March: IMF approves Extended Fund Facility.
September: New central bank charter provides for independence of monetary authorities
prohibits financing of public sector deficit, and removes lender-of-last-resort functions.
December: Tax code reforms make evasion more difficult.  Foreign debt is restructured
through Brady plan, with US$27 billion exchanged for bonds. Banks regain access to
international capital markets.
1993:
Overall: Provincial governments’ aggregate spending registers an increase of 60% over
1991, with including a wage increase of 66%.  Argentine companies are allowed to
access international capital markets through American Depository Receipts (ADRs).45
August: The Federal Fiscal Pact is introduced to strengthen fiscal adjustment in
provinces.
October: Pension reform law.
November: Agreement is reached on reforming the constitution.
1994:
Overall:  Argentina is unable to comply with  IMF fiscal targets as a result of
overspending. International interest rates rise.
June: A private pension system is created (partly public pay-as-you-go, with a
complementary private capitalized system for supplementary pensions). This system is
expected to channel about US$3 billion a year to capital markets. In transition period,
shift in payments to private system increases fiscal deficit by close to 1% of GDP.
July: New constitution is adopted.
November: All pending government expenditure is cut off for the remainder of the year.
The 1995 budget is reduced by US$1 billion.
December: Mexico devalues its currency.
1995:
Overall: Mexican crisis leads to a recession, with a 17.6% loss in deposits (US$8 billion)
and a 30% loss in reserves (US$4.8 billion). Unemployment increases to 18.4%, and net
capital inflows fall from  US$10.7 billion in 1994 to  US$2.7 billion in 1995. Trade
balance improves.
January: Commercial banks are forced to convert reserve deposits at central bank into
dollars.
February-March: Export subsidies and public wages are reduced, while VAT is
increased. Good terms of trade and an increase in exports help to make the crisis less
severe. An international financial package of US$11 billion is arranged. Interest rates are
increased to avoid a run on the currency, and additional measures are undertaken to avoid
bank failures and increase liquidity. The central bank charter is modified to provide
greater flexibility in managing liquidity crises. Pressure is exerted on provinces to
privatize provincial banks.46
May: Bank deposits begin to recover, but bank credit remains depressed.  Menem is
reelected.
1996:
Overall: Reforms in banking sector establish a safety net with higher reserve and capital
requirements. When the contingency safety net is taken into account, liquid reserves are
30% of deposits. A domestic public debt market is developed, with new peso instruments
of both short-term and 2-3 year maturity.  Banks’ liquidity holdings requirement is
increased by 2%. Compulsory labor risk insurance (ART) is enacted. Pension funds reach
US$3.6 billion, consisting of 51% in public debt instruments, 25% in term deposits, and
17 % in stocks and private-sector debt instruments.
July: Cavallo leaves office and is replaced by. Fernandez.
1997:
Overall: VAT makes up 52% of tax revenue (excluding social security contributions).
Argentina holds US$6.1 billion in REPO with international banks (contingency credit
lines). Investment funds grow fast (US$4 billion by mid year).
September: Foreign firms can be quoted on the stock exchange (through mechanism of
certificados de  deposito  argentino).  Foreign holdings are allowed to be included in
pension fund portfolios.
October:  Alianza party wins congressional elections. The Asian crisis goes almost
unnoticed but for a fall in the stock market and declining external balances due to
worsening terms of trade.  The banking system remains solid, as deposits continue to rise.
1998:
Argentina signs a three-year extended fund agreement with IMF for US$2.8 billion.  Tax
reforms, though not major, include extension of VAT to previously exempted activities
and a “single tax” for small businesses and the self-employed. No major changes occur in
labor issues, but some existing flexible labor contracts are eliminated.  Intergovernmental
revenue issues are addressed by a guaranteed minimum level of “coparticipación,”
though the common pool problem is still unresolved since half of provinces’ revenues47
come from coparticipación, with little incentives to fight tax evasion.  Russian crisis
makes less foreign capital available, but there is no capital flight. Stock market falls.
Prices of both exports and imports fall. Recession in Brazil leads to an incipient recession
in Argentina.
1999:
Overall: Brazilian enters economic crisis. The peso becomes even more overvalued as
Brazilian and other Latin American currencies fall. Exports fall dramatically, especially
to Brazil. As the recession reduces imports, however, the trade balance starts to show
surpluses. As interest payments start rising due to increased country risk (due to political
uncertainties), current account still does not improve much. The depth of the recession
surprises most analysts: it is now predicted that GDP will fall more than during the
Tequila crisis.
The government introduces measures to reduce labor costs (through lower payroll
taxes), promote exports, monitor imports for evidence of “dumping, ” and ease access to
credit, especially for PYMEs. Additional measures are undertaken for specific sectors
such as  automotives and agriculture. Although the Central Bank refuses to reduce
liquidity requirements, a plan is under discussion to refinance loans to PYMEs held by
the Banco Nacion.
Although the financial system is still very strong, a small number of institutions
are closed following the Brazilian devaluation. Private sector loans are flat for the first
semester, although non-financial public sector borrowing has increased sharply.
The practice of covering government financing needs several months in advance
is kept in effect, and Argentina is able to return to international capital markets shortly
after Brazil’s devaluation. However, political uncertainties regarding the impending
presidential elections sharply increase the country’s risk-premium, which almost reaches
Brazil’s by mid-July.
April: IMF agrees to increase public deficit target by US$2 billion to $4.95 billion, on the
grounds that the higher deficit resulted from external factors and not excessive spending,
but the deficit is likely to be even higher. The 1998 tax reform, at first thought to provide48
enough extra revenue to be able to eliminate payroll taxes, actually only dampens a still-
significant drop in revenue. As part of the accord, the government agreed to five pieces of
legislation: fiscal convertibility, conversion of Banco  Nacion into SA, reforms to the
Central Bank charter, reforms of the social security system, and an overhaul of the
scheme for sharing tax revenue with the provinces. These changes do not seem likely to
pass before the change of government (although the fiscal convertibility measure passes
the chamber of deputies).49
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